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Alister McGrath, A Passion for Truth.(1)
Introduction
I first became aware of Alister McGrath while teaching in
the extension program for Trinity Episcopal School for Ministry.
I taught theology, and the texts included his Christian
Theology Reader, as well as his Christian Theology, An
Introduction. One is a reader, composed of selections of
major theological importance. The other is simply descriptive,
an introduction to basic theological concepts. Both reveal that
McGrath has read throughout the whole of the theological
tradition. Neither text, however present McGrath's evangelical
point of view. McGrath is a leading evangelical thinker, and
therefore, I decided to read him further as I wanted to
investigate the theological underpinnings of evangelicalism. For
that reason, I chose his A Passion for Truth, the Intellectual
Coherence of Evangelicalism. I had heard that this book does
what it claims, sets out the basic tenets of evangelicalism in a
theologically coherent manner.
In this text McGrath makes a number of important orthodox
claims. He clearly believes in Jesus Christ, recognizes certain
fundamentals of the Christian faith, seeks to counter theological
alternatives that compromise crucial Christian beliefs, and is
critical of cultural attitudes that undermine the Christian
faith. I do not think, however, that he fulfills the goal of
this book. He describes that goal in these words,
The essential precondition for a renewed evangelical
engagement with intellectual life is confidence in its own
coherence and credibility. This study therefore aims to explore
the coherence of evangelicalism by bringing out the inner
consistency of the evangelical approach and demonstrating the
internal contradictions and vulnerabilities of its contemporary
rivals.(2)
As this essay will make clear, McGrath rightly recognizes
that his rivals have distorted Christian truth. He has not,
however, been able to lay bare the essential "contradictions
and vulnerabilities" of his contemporary rivals. This is
due to his not having solved the theological issues that drove
his rivals to their false solutions. Among other things, a
theological solution would involve overcoming Kant's claim that
God the Word cannot be known by the categories of the
understanding. Since he has not resolved critical theological
difficulties, he is forced to adopt aspects of the positions he
rejects. Simply put, he recognizes aspects of Christian truth,
but he has not theologically resolved the issues that would place
that truth upon a solid theological foundation. I shall show
this.
In an introductory essay, I described a fault line running
through contemporary theology by means of the theological ideas
of "objective" and "ecstatic." link I will begin by describing the
objective elements found in McGrath's theological perspective.
The Objective Element in McGrath
For McGrath, Christian revelation is particular, truthful,
cognitive, and historical. By "particular," he means
that Christian revelation is not based on universal truths of
reason or a universal religious experience. Rather than
universals, Christian faith begins with the unique and definite
person Jesus Christ as normatively revealed in Scripture. As
narrated in Scripture, Christ is not a universal idea, nor is he
validated by any exterior claim. He is his own person, the
unique revelation of God, the one who was born of Mary, suffered
under Pontius Pilate, died and rose again. Because
evangelicalism centers on the person of Jesus Christ, its
particularity is derived from Christ as a definite person.
As we shall see, evangelicalism is emphatic in affirming not
merely the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, but his
definitiveness; however, the affirmation of the former is
an important first step in the defence of the latter.(3)
The particularity of the Christian gospel and supremely the
person of Jesus Christ as saviour and Lord, does not conflict in
any manner with its universal scope. Indeed, the evangelical
passion for truth is expressed partly in its focus on the person
of Christ, in that Jesus Christ is the truth.(4)
McGrath makes the claim of particularity over against all
forms of belief that begin with a prior ideological or cultural
commitments that justify faith in Christ. For example,
liberalism began with a claim to a universal religious
experience, Nazi Christians began with assumptions about the form
of Christian faith in the cultural and historical context of
Germany, old-style evangelicalism began with rationalistic
assumptions that faith could be reduced to simple propositions of
reason, and the theology of Eusebius was tied to a cultural ideal
of the Christian emperor. McGrath gives these as examples, and
all of them deny Christ's own authority for they affirm that
Jesus Christ needs to be validated by something prior to him.
Evangelicalism rejects this.
Furthermore, ideologies are embedded in and express cultural
assumptions, assumptions that evolve with culture itself. Once a
culture changes, past ideological commitments no longer hold.
For example, in a post-modern world the idea of a universal
religious experience is no longer credible, nor is it taken for
granted that faith can be reduced to simple propositions. When
the Christian faith ties itself to a prior ideological
commitment, it inevitably digs its own grave for ideologies come
and go with time and circumstance.
By contrast, evangelicalism does not begin with general
ideas or a culturally determined context. It begins with the
specific historical revelation of Jesus Christ. This definite
revelation can achieve universal scope because God can act
anywhere and at any time to reveal himself through Scripture and
the preaching of the gospel. Nor does this specific revelation
require any prior ideological commitments or worldview. It
depends upon God, for only God can reveal God. In this way
evangelicalism is able to avoid the pitfall of shackling itself
to a transient ideological commitment or philosophical
perspective. Here is McGrath.
The fundamental revelational axiom of the Christian faith is that
only God can reveal God, just as its fundamental soteriological
axiom is that only God can save.(5)
To allow our ideas and values to become controlled by anything or
anyone other than the self-revelation of God in Scripture is to
adopt an ideology, rather than a theology; it is to become
controlled by ideas and values whose origins lie outside the
Christian tradition--and potentially to become enslaved to
them.(6)
As the rise of Nazism and Stalinism have made abundantly clear,
cultural trends need to be criticized. They cannot be allowed to
be normative. And that demands that Christianity ground itself
on something which transcends cultural particularities--namely,
the self-revelation of God.(7)
There will be those outside evangelicalism and outside
Christianity who will want to make other figures, powers,
principles and values of foundational importance. Evangelical
Christianity, however, is unashamedly Christ-centered. Jesus
Christ is the gospel. However complex subsequent theological
reflection of this may become, evangelicalism affirms that all
must be based upon Christ, and all must be judged by Christ--not
seeing him simply as a source of ideas, but as the foundation of
every aspect of the Christian life.(8)
Secondly, the statements of Christian revelation are true
statements. Here McGrath is critical of postliberalism,
especially the work of George Lindbeck, one of the more important
postliberal thinkers. According to McGrath, Lindbeck allows
theology to give up all claims of speaking truthfully of God.
Lindbeck does this by making a distinction between first and
second order language. First order language for God is the
language of prayer, of worship, and of faith. It is language
that relates one directly to God or reveals him in some immediate
fashion. Second order statements are statements about first
order statements. Lindbeck wants to restrict theology to second
order statements, to regulative rules about how one uses language
to talk of and to God. For him, theology deals with syntax, not
semantics. As such, he doesn't want to discuss whether or not
theological statements speak the truth of God. But this raises
serious questions, and McGrath raises them. Do theological
statements relate to God? and if so, how? In what sense if any,
are they true revelations of God? Or, how does it happen that
religious language can have truth claims? For McGrath,
theological statements must reflect truth. They are not simply
rules for using first order language. Over against Lindbeck,
McGrath asks the following questions,
The critical question which arises from this approach, [that of
Lindbeck] to which we shall return later in this chapter, is
whether theology is simply about the grammar of faith--that is to
say, regulation of Christian discourse. To what does this
discourse relate? Is there some reality or set of realities
outside the biblical text to which the biblical narrative
relates? Do theological assertions simply articulate biblical
grammar, or do they relate to some objective order, irrespective
of whether we recognize this relation or not? As we shall see,
one central evangelical anxiety concerning the postliberal
approach is that it appears to represent a purely intratextual
affair, with little concern for its possible relation to an
external objective reality.(9)
Against Lindbeck and postliberalism, McGrath and
evangelicalism believe that both Scripture and Christian doctrine
express truth. Both bring knowledge of an "external
objective reality." McGrath's understanding of how this
happens will be discussed shortly.
Further, for evangelicalism, revelation is cognitive. This
follows from what has gone before. "Cognitive" means
that revelation can be understood by the mind. Since Scripture
is written in words that appeal to the mind, and since it is
revelation, revelation is cognitive. At the same time, however,
McGrath will argue that the purely cognitive aspects of faith do
not exhaust the biblical concept of revelation. More is involved
than just the mind. At this point McGrath is critical of the
old-style evangelicalism that tended to reduce faith to
propositions rather than grasping the multidimensional aspect of
Christian revelation.
This is in no sense to deny or to de-emphasize the cognitive
aspects of Christian theology. It is merely to observe that
there is more to theology than cerebralized information. A
theology which touches the mind, leaving the heart unaffected, is
no true Christian theology--a point stressed by both Luther and
Calvin.(10)
While I have argued that this approach [revelation as purely
propositional] to Christian doctrine is inadequate, in that it
fails to do justice to the full complexity of the biblical
notions of revelation, it remains axiomatic for evangelicals that
both revelation and doctrine have cognitive or informational
aspects.(11)
For understandable reasons, evangelicalism has in the past chosen
to focus on the propositional or cognitive element of the complex
network of divine revelation--an element which allowed
evangelicalism to maintain its credibility and integrity during a
period of rationalist assault. But the ensuring understanding of
`revelation' was itself dangerous deficient, verging on the
aridity and sterility which were the hallmarks of the same
rationalism which evangelicalism was seeking to oppose. ...
Recognizing the narrative quality of Scripture allows the
fullness of biblical revelation to be recovered. In no way does
this strategy involve the abandoning or weakening of an
evangelical commitment to the objective cognitive truth of divine
revelation. It is simply to recognize that revelation involves
more than this, and to commend the wisdom of avoiding
reductionist approaches to the issue.(12)
Finally, for both McGrath and evangelicalism, revelation is
historical. It is not derived from timeless universal truths,
but founded upon the concrete historical person of Jesus Christ
as known in Scripture. For this reason, evangelicalism cannot
accept the approach of scholars such as Bultmann and Tillich.
These scholars claim that it is the biblical story of Jesus
Christ that bears salvation rather than the actual historical
person of Jesus given in Scripture. Against Tillich and
Bultmann, McGrath affirms that Scripture gives accurate
historical knowledge of Jesus Christ, and that this knowledge of
Christ is saving knowledge.
As is well known, Tillich and Bultmann were attempting to
free the message of Scripture from the corrosive insights of the
biblical historical method. This method threatened to show that
major portions to the New Testament were creations of the early
church rather than actual historical events in the life of
Christ. McGrath will accept the critical historical method, but
he believes that contemporary biblical scholarship is showing
that Christian faith cannot be detached from the historical
Jesus.
The method [historical critical method] is to be welcomed,
because it takes seriously the incarnational principle, noted
earlier, that God has chosen to reveal himself not in some
timeless ahistorical form, or in abstract propositions, but in
particular historical contexts and through real historical
people.(13)
The Christological content of the Christian proclamation is
minimized in the writings of Rudolf Bultmann, Gerhard Ebeling,
and especially Paul Tillich. Tillich's theology sits so loose to
the figure of Jesus that he can dispense with his historical
existence and personality without making any noticeable
difference to his theology. Jesus illustrates a principle, which
can be and is illustrated by others. ... Bultmann understood the
proclamation or kerygma primarily in terms of an active
and effective word, summoning its hearers to an existential
decision. There was thus no informational `content' (concerning,
for example, the historical figure of Jesus) to the kerygma. ...
However, recent scholarship has decisively undermined the New
Testament basis of this trend toward detaching Christian faith
from the historical Jesus.(14)
What critical theological insight is needed if one is to
say, as does McGrath, that the revelation in Jesus Christ is
particular, truthful, cognitive, and historical? I would
maintain that one would need an objective understanding of
revelation. As God the Word takes form in the person of Jesus
Christ, in the words of Scripture, and in the proclamation of the
gospel, God the Word becomes particular, finite, and limited
while still remaining God. In the event of God becoming
objective--finite, spoken, heard, touched, and seen--the mind can
grasp God. As this happens, revelation becomes cognitive. In
actual fact, it becomes more than cognitive. The whole person
including the body receives the Word. While it is God the Word
that takes concrete form, it is God the Holy Spirit that enables
the mind and the whole self to respond to God as revealed in the
Word. This event of God taking form happens as an event. It is
not a general property of created existence. It is a miracle,
something that comes from without. It happens as God wills, as
God acts, as God the Father sends the Son. As an event that
becomes events, Christian revelation is historical. In this way
one knows God, and in this event of knowing God, God the Word
truthfully reveals God. The whole self, body and soul, truly
knows God because the revelation is truthful. As in John's
gospel, "I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one
comes to the Father except by me."
The foregoing requires a doctrine of the Trinity as well as
Christology. I have discussed this throughout my writings on
this website. This form of Trinitarian and Christological
analysis is missing in McGrath. He belongs to a tradition that
has read Scripture and read it as it is. For this reason he
knows that revelation is particular, historical, cognitive and
truthful. In McGrath's case, however, these objective
characteristics are not placed on a secure theological
foundation. He sees the surface characteristics of Christian
truth, but he has not grasped their intelligibility by grounding
them securely in Trinity and Christology. At no point in this
book does he do this. This can now be seen in greater detail by
examining his response to liberalism. As an example of
liberalism, I will draw on the work of Schleiermacher, the father
of liberalism.
McGrath's Response to Liberalism
First and foremost, McGrath states that liberalism "was
especially hostile to any form of particularism, such as the
notion of a special divine revelation."(15) Rather than
a particular divine revelation, liberalism grounds faith in a
universal human experience of the divine. The problem with this,
according to McGrath, is that the claim of a universal religious
experience cannot be sustained. Such a belief was an
Enlightenment idea, a belief lacking widespread acceptance in our
postmodern age. Simply put, there is no compelling evidence of a
universal religious experience as postulated by liberalism. In
McGrath's words, "But there are difficulties here. The most
obvious is that there is actually very little empirical evidence
for a `common core experience' throughout human history and
culture."(16) As a result, liberalism fails because it
is based on an outmoded concept of universal revelation.
Contrary to McGrath's assessment, however, liberalism does
not deny the particularity of the Christian faith.
Schleiermacher, for example, was a romantic, reacting to the
Enlightenment claim of universal principles. As a romantic, he
affirmed the particular, the organic, the historical, and the
whole as more than the sum of its parts. This appears as early
as his Speeches. He did affirm a universal sense of the
divine. He called it the "feeling of absolute
dependence," but this feeling received particular and
concrete expression in the person of Jesus Christ. As Christians
worship Jesus, as they study, pray, and fellowship, they are
shaped into his image. Their piety, life, worship, and values
take a particular concrete form given to them in the biblical
story of Jesus Christ as lived in their particular cultural
context.
Having said this, however, it must be said that
Schleiermacher's sense of the particular only extends to the
human Jesus. It does not extend to Christ's divine nature. For
Schleiermacher, the divine nature of Christ is essentially
mystical. I discussed this in my essay on Schleiermacher. link McGrath seems unaware of this.
He simply says that liberalism denies the particular. Were he to
theologically examine the matter, he might notice that liberalism
proclaims the human particularity of Jesus Christ but has great
difficulty in understanding how Christ's divine nature could be
particular. In other words, McGrath could use the Chalcedon
doctrine of two natures in one person to assess in what sense
liberalism denies particularity. This would entail a theological
analysis and enable a penetrating theological assessment of
liberalism. McGrath does not do this. The relevance of this
failure will become more apparent as this essay unfolds.
Further, in his response to liberalism's claim of a
universal religious experience, McGrath draws on Lindbeck.
Lindbeck characterizes liberalism has a form of
"experiential-expressivism." By this he means that
liberalism begins with an experience of the holy and then
expresses that experience in words. Within this perspective lies
the notion that all religions have a common experience of the
divine, and that this core sense is expressed in different ways
according to the various religious traditions. Against
experiential-expressivism, Lindbeck claims, and McGrath follows
him at this point, that words don't necessarily express
experience. They create religious experience. Given that, it
cannot be claimed that the different religions express the same
reality in different ways. As Lindbeck sees it, different
religious have different languages, rites, and doctrines, and
these languages create different religious experiences.
It must be noted, however, that McGrath is not making a
theological argument at this point. He is simply accepting
Lindbeck's conception of language, a perspective grounded in
Wittgenstein rather than the biblical faith. Were McGrath to
address the matter theologically and biblically, he might begin
by theologically analyzing the biblical concept of Word. This
might shed some light on how the experience of God is related to
words. Such an analysis would be an example of his claim that
evangelical theology holds to Scripture as its final authority.
As it is, McGrath simply states that it cannot be empirically
shown that religious language reflects religious experience, and
further, that there are those who think language creates
experience.
Even more telling, however, is the fact that McGrath himself
claims a universal human experience. By virtue of humanity's
creation in the image of God and the marring of that image by
sin, all persons have a sense that something has been lost. This
sense of loss is a universal human experience of religious
import. McGrath refers to Plato, Augustine, and C.S. Lewis who
describe an inner emptiness, restlessness, an aching longing that
can never be filled until one knows God.(17) Further, in his
chapter on evangelicalism and other religions, he states that all
persons, by virtue of their creation in God's image, have a
latent memory of God. This latent memory and the resulting
search for the transcendent are a universal experience common to
all humanity. It reflects a degree of convergence between the
world's religions.
To use Augustine's vocabulary, the point of contact is a
latent memory of God, reinforced by an encounter with his
creation, which possesses the potential to point us to the source
through which its sense of bitter-sweet longing may be
satisfied.(18)
A fundamental impulse which seems to lie behind religious
experience--the quest for the transcendent--can be accounted for
within the framework of Christian theology. ... But my basic
contention is that the gospel itself enables us to understand why
the various religious traditions of humanity exist, and why there
might well be at least some degree of convergence among them in
relation to a search for fulfillment.(19)
The question then arises, How does this latent memory, this
sense of longing, this degree of convergence in search of the
transcendent, differ from the feeling of absolute dependence that
Schleiermacher claims belongs to all humanity? Until this
question is answered, and McGrath does not answer it, he has not
really addressed the liberal form of religion.
But that brings us to a further question. Why did
Schleiermacher adopt the "feeling of absolute
dependence" as a fundamental category? That category takes
various forms in liberalism--the encounter with the holy
(Macquarrie) the experience of ecstasy (Tillich)--and it lies at
the core of the liberal perspective. I would submit that
Schleiermacher adopted this category because he accepted Kant's
dictum that God cannot be grasped by the categories of the
understanding. Or, to put it in ordinary language, God cannot be
known by the mind in the manner in which we conceive objects. As
a result, Schleiermacher formulated a way of knowing God in which
God could not be known objectively. I will come back to this.
Suffice it to say, I am convinced that McGrath, if he wants to
engage liberalism, will need to address Kant's denial of any
objective knowledge of God.
Further, McGrath claims that liberalism cannot fully
distinguish between different religious commitments. For
example, what is the difference between a person who is a
nominally a Christian and one who is a born-again committed
Christian. According to McGrath, liberalism cannot account for
these differences since liberalism holds to experience, all
experience, as a fundamental datum. "`Experience' is thus
treated by liberalism as something which is homogeneous, common
and unchanging, unaffected by alterations in religious
affiliations--in short, something universal, upon which
theology may construct itself in the public arena.(20)
This argument fails to do justice to the liberal position.
Schleiermacher was well aware of the difference between the
committed and uncommitted person. In his view, the God-
consciousness of the uncommitted is latent but not active. For
the practicing Christians, those inflamed by prayer, worship, and
faith, their God-consciousness is strong and vital. The whole
point of Schleiermacher's Speeches, a perspective carried
over into his theology, depended upon their being a difference
between a latent and an active sense of the divine.
Phenomenologically, he describes the difference. Without that
difference, his theology simply collapses.
Further, McGrath asks, How does liberalism know if one is
really experiencing God, rather than one's own thoughts, or
perhaps the god of another religion? "Experience may indeed
seek expression--but it also demands a criterion by which it may
be judged."(21) Apparently, McGrath thinks liberalism
lacks such a criterion. But liberalism does have a criterion by
which one can discriminate between religious experiences.
Schleiermacher believed that the biblical history of Jesus
Christ, made alive in worship, prayer, and study, so formed the
sense of God as to distinguish the Father of Jesus Christ from
other experiences of the divine. He believed this because he
believed that truth is particular and not universal.
McGrath also wonders how liberalism can emphasize the
present experience of a believer if God is not there to be
experienced?(22) Presumably, liberalism does not adequately
address this question. Liberalism is aware of the sense of God's
absence. In fact, it was critical to the whole of
Schleiermacher's theology. His aim was to arouse dead souls to
an awareness of the divine. Prior to the coming of the gospel,
human beings experienced God as absent. With the coming of the
gospel, God became alive to them. Schleiermacher and
evangelicalism agree on this. If McGrath wishes to counter
liberalism at this point, he would need to describe how
liberalism and evangelicalism differ in regard to God's presence
and absence, and from there, analyze that difference biblically
and theologically. That does not happen.
In short, McGrath knows there is something wrong with
liberalism, but he doesn't quite know what it is. He knows it
has denied particularly, but he doesn't seem to understand that
it affirms the human particularity of Jesus Christ while denying
his divine particularity. He oversimplifies the matter when he
simply says that liberalism abhors the particular. His other
claims are inadequate as well. Over against liberalism's
particularity, he states that it claims a universal human
experience pointing toward God. He makes the same claim. He
further claims that liberalism cannot distinguish between the
true and the false God, that it lacks a criterion for
distinguishing between particular religious expressions, or
between true belief and nominal belief. But liberalism makes all
these distinctions by means of the finite, particular nature of
Jesus Christ. What McGrath fails to see is that liberalism does
not affirm that God the Word became flesh--finite, particular,
and limited. This failure is the real source of the liberal
heresy. As I shall show, McGrath fails in this regard as well,
in spite of an admixture of orthodox elements.
Having exposed what he considers to be the weakness of
liberalism, McGrath must now advance his own theological
position. He begins with the claim that "Christian theology
provides an interpretative framework by which human experience
may be interpreted."(23) McGrath describes how this
happens with these words.
According to this approach, experience is an explicandum,
something which itself requires to be interpreted. Christian
theology provides a framework by which the ambiguities of
experience may be interpreted. Theology aims to interpret
experience. It is like a net which we can cast over experience,
in order to capture its meaning. Experience is seen as something
which is to be interpreted, rather than something which is itself
capable of interpreting. Christian theology thus aims to
address, interpret, and transform human
experience.(24)
In regard to his claim that theology addresses, interprets,
and transforms experience, McGrath makes several observations.
First, theology addresses experience because God transforms human
beings. Here McGrath reflects aspects of the objective
perspective.
As Calvin pointed out, to know God is to be changed by God; true
knowledge of God leads to worship, as the believer is caught up
in a transforming and renewing encounter with the living God. To
know God is to be changed by God.(25)
To be a real theologian is to wrestle with none other than
the living God--not with ideas about God, but with God himself.
And how can a sinner ever hope to deal adequately with this
God?(26)
But, Luther insists, the real theologian is someone who
has experienced a sense of condemnation on account of sin--who
reads the New Testament and realizes that its message of
forgiveness is for him or her. The gospel is thus experienced as
something liberating, something which transforms our situation,
something which is relevant to us.(27)
Liberals could easily make the statements just quoted.
Schleiermacher felt he was being true to the essence of Scripture
and the Reformers. Nevertheless, liberalism reinterprets these
sources in ways that deny their real substance. That is what
McGrath needs to uncover at this point. He needs to show how the
statements just quoted mean something very different when
proclaimed by liberals. To do that, he needs doctrine. He needs
to develop the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology in
relation to the liberalism and the Reformers. He advances no
substantive theological analysis at this point. Without
doctrine, there is no real way to separate liberalism from an
orthodox position. Simply quoting the Reformers is not enough.
Further, the statement that to "be a real
theologian is to wrestle with none other than the living God--not
with ideas about God, but with God himself," gives the
impression that McGrath has not really grasped how a "ideas
about God" can become "God himself." I will say
more on this in subsequent paragraphs.
In regard to theology interpreting experience, McGrath
presents the liberal idea that there is a universal experience
(Plato, Augustine, and Lewis), and theology makes sense of it.
This has been discussed in previous paragraphs. At this point,
it can be said that there is nothing in this section that would
theologically separate evangelicalism from liberalism. Both
claim a universal experience, and both claim that theology
functions to interpret experience.
Finally, McGrath notes that theology transforms experience.
This was really the content of his section on theology addressing
experience, but here a few new elements are added. Most
significantly, McGrath draws on C.S. Lewis to make the following
statement,
At its best, Christian theology shares this characteristic of
poetic language ... it tries to convey to us the quality of the
Christian experience of God. It attempts to point beyond itself,
to rise above itself, straining at its lead as it rushes ahead,
to point us to a town beyond its map--town which it knows is
there, but to which it cannot lead us. ... It uses a cluster of
key words to try and explain what it is like to know God, by
analogy with words associated with human experience.(28)
As will be seen, this quotation could well belong in the
following section. It is one of many statements that show that
McGrath has not grasped how God the Son can become objective as a
biblical word or a theological phrase. In the end, he has a
liberal understanding of how God speaks, and this will become
even more apparent through an analysis of McGrath's response to
Lindbeck and postliberalism. Before doing that, however, it
might be helpful to say a few more words about Lindbeck.
Lindbeck and Postliberalism
Lindbeck describes three ways of understanding religious
language.(29) They are experiential-expressive, cognitive-
propositionalist, and cultural-linguistic. The first is the view
that religious language expresses an experience of God. That is
the liberal view already discussed. In this view, language only
points to God. It is symbolic because God's transcendence makes
literal statements impossible. The second would hold that
doctrinal statements and the language of Scripture are true
statements about God or the very thoughts of God. This is the
view of fundamentalism and certain forms of evangelicalism. The
third is the approach of Lindbeck himself.
Of these three approaches to knowing God, the cognitive-
propositionalist view is, according to Lindbeck, the older view.
This view was demolished by Kant, and that demolition gave rise
to liberalism's formulation of the experiential-expressive model.
Here is Lindbeck.
The origins of this tradition [experiential-expressive] in one
sense go back to Kant, for he helped clear the ground for its
emergence by demolishing the metaphysical and epistemological
foundations of the earlier regnant cognitive-propositional views.
That ground-clearing was later completed for most educated people
by scientific developments that increased the difficulties of
accepting literalistic propositional interpretations of such
biblical doctrines as creation, and by historical studies that
implied the time-conditioned relativity of all doctrines. Kant,
however, did not replace the view of religion he had undermined
with a more adequate one. ... That breach was filled, beginning
with Schleiermacher, with what I have called "experiential-
expressivism", but this comes in many varieties and can be
given many names.(30)
Further, Lindbeck is critical of evangelicalism for
embracing the older view, the cognitive-propositionalist
understanding of religious language. In Lindbeck's view,
evangelicals really seem to believe that one can speak of God
with the same assurance one might have in speaking of a rock, a
tree, or a dog. McGrath describes Lindbeck's criticism of
evangelicalism and the cognitive-propositionalist approach with
these words,
Lindbeck argues that this approach [cognitive-propositionalist]
is to be rejected as voluntarist, intellectualist and literalist,
even making the suggestion that those who `perceive or experience
religion in cognitivist fashion' are those who `combine unusual
insecurity with naïveté'.(31)
As an evangelical, McGrath must defend himself against
Lindbeck. He does so as follows.
First, at least in part, he gives way to Lindbeck. He
asserts that evangelicals no longer accept the view that
revelation is strongly propositional. This was the view held,
for example, by Charles Hodge (1797-1858) and the Princeton
School. This school claimed that words and propositions spoke
directly of God, and that the mind could understand them. Modern
evangelicals no longer need to believe this. This is McGrath's
description of the Princeton School, a position he rejects.
Words can be known directly and immediately by the human mind,
without the need for any intermediaries. To know the words of
Scripture is thus to know immediately the realities to which they
relate. This theory of language is of foundational importance,
as it undergirds Hodge's belief that today's reader of Scripture
can be `assured of encountering the very words, thoughts, and
intentions of God Himself.' Yet this metaphysical idea has been
borrowed along with others of equally questionable theological
parentage from the Enlightenment.(32)
Secondly, in regard to Lindbeck's claim that evangelicals
are naive intellectualists, McGrath responds by saying that
evangelicals now have a more sophisticated understanding of
language than that found in the older evangelicalism. They no
longer believe that one can speak of God with the same assurance
that one speaks of trees, dogs, or rocks. To validate his
position, McGrath sets forth his ideas on language for God. I
will quote him exhaustively at this point. I do so in order to
make two points. First, as McGrath's thinking unfolds, he gives
up the idea that language for God can be propositional. Language
for God is much more subtle, elusive, poetical. He does,
however, maintain the cognitive aspect in that the mind must be
active in order to receive revelation. That is virtually a
truism. Secondly, because he hasn't really come to terms with
Kant, he will adopt the liberal view that religious language
expresses religious experience. This will be quite obvious in
what follows. Here is McGrath.
If an experience is to be articulated in words, in order to
communicate or to attempt a communal envision of this experience,
some form of a cognitive-propositional dimension is inevitable.
Yet his does not reduce the experience to words, but simply to
attempt to convey it through words.(33)
Such rhetorical analyses of experience offer a means by which a
cognitive account may be given of experience without in any sense
reducing experience to propositional form or degenerating into
`literalism' in the vague by ultimately pejorative sense of the
term employed by Lindbeck.(34)
The fundamental insight here is that human words cannot
adequately define experience, but may nevertheless point towards
it, as signposts.(35)
Underlying the profundity of human experience and encounter lies
an unresolved tension--the tension between the wish to express an
experience in words, and the inability of words to capture that
experience in its fullness.(36)
Words can point to an experience, they can begin to sketch its
outlines--but the total descriptions of that experience remains
beyond words. Words point beyond themselves, to something
greater which eludes their grasp. Human words, and the
categories which they express, are stretched to their limits as
they attempt to encapsulate, to communicate, something which
tantalizingly refuses to be reduced to words. It is the sheer
elusiveness of human experience, its obstinate refusal to be
imprisoned within a verbal matrix, which points to the need for
poetry, symbolism, and doctrine alike. An impatience with
precisely this elusiveness appears to underline the rejection of
any cognitive component to doctrinal statements.(37)
The intimation of something further, beyond and signposted by
experience, is characteristic of human experience. We live on
the borderlands of something more--something intimated, something
ultimately lying beyond the horizons of our comprehension, yet on
occasion intruding into our consciousness. Experience and
language point beyond themselves, testifying that something lies
beyond their borderlands, yet into which we tantalizingly cannot
enter.(38)
In light of the above quotations, McGrath makes the
following claims: 1. The experience of the divine cannot be
reduced to words, it can only be conveyed. 2. The experience
cannot be put in propositional or literal form. This would be a
degeneration. 3. Words point toward the thing experienced. They
do not define the experience. 4. Words cannot capture the
experience in its fullness. 5. Words point to an experience,
they begin to sketch its outline, but the experience is elusive.
It cannot be reduced to words. 6. Poetry and symbolism are
required. 7. What is glimpsed in religious language is
intimated, something beyond the horizon of our comprehension,
something tantalizing we cannot enter.
As one reads these statements, it becomes clear that
McGrath's understanding of religious language is virtually
identical to Schleiermacher's. In both cases the ineffable
experience of God is expressed in words that are poetical or
symbolic due to the fact that the reality to which they point
lies "beyond the horizons of our comprehension." That
is where Schleiermacher began, and from that starting point he
inevitably made his way toward his panentheistic doctrine, a
doctrine that McGrath would consider anathema. McGrath, however,
does not press forward to the logical conclusion. He should
conclude that whatever is beyond the "horizons of our
comprehension," beyond the "borderlands" of words,
something "into which we tantalizingly cannot enter,"
should have no real verbal content. But McGrath is not
consistent on the matter. Here are two quotations from another
section of McGrath's text, a section in which McGrath speaks of
the objectivity of the biblical revelation.
Recognizing the narrative quality of Scripture allows the
fullness of biblical revelation to be recovered. In no way does
this strategy involve the abandoning or weakening of an
evangelical commitment to the objective cognitive truth of divine
revelation.(39)
Scripture, as we have seen, possesses a strongly objective
dimension, in that it tells us about the way things are; it also
possesses a subjective component, through which it offers to
transform our inner lives ... As Luther put it, we read Scripture
not simply to learn of the `commands of God' (mandata Dei) but to
encounter the `God who commands' (Deus mandantus), and to be
transformed as a result.(40)
These two statements are not theologically coordinated with
the view of language McGrath uses in response to Lindbeck. One
needs Trinity and Christology here. In my first essay on
objective and ecstatic, I made the following statement, "In
the objective view, theological statements can literally refer to
God the Word who became objective. Theological language can
also contain symbolic aspects since the Word reveals God the
Father who is holy and transcendent." link From this perspective, and
referring to McGrath as just quoted, the "commands of
God" are God the Son in objective form. The "God who
commands" is the Father who sends forth his Son as the
incarnation of God's commands. The event of hearing the
"commands of God" leads one to the Father who commands,
but the Father who commands "dwells in light
unapproachable," link so that
the commands themselves, though objective, symbolically and
poetically point beyond themselves to the transcendent Father.
link Since McGrath has not worked
the matter out theologically, he does not propose an evangelical
alternative to Lindbeck, nor does he theologically ground the
objectivity of the biblical revelation. Were he to do so, he
would not offer a liberal response to Lindbeck. He would allow
theology to follow Scripture and affirm that a critical aspect of
the biblical revelation is cognitive and propositional.(41)
Further, McGrath not only accepts an experiential-expressive
model in regard to first-order language, he does the same with
second-order language, that is, with doctrine. In his view,
doctrine doesn't really refer to an "external objective
reality" as claimed. Rather, doctrinal statements reflect
the experience of the divine and only glimpse what they
symbolize. Consider the following.
Underlying such attempts to achieve clarity of concepts and
modes of discourse is the recognition that doctrinal affirmations
are to be recognized as perceptions, not total descriptions,
pointing beyond themselves toward the greater mystery of God
himself.(42)
For such theologians, doctrines are reliable, yet incomplete
descriptions of reality. Their power lies in what they represent
rather than in what they are in themselves.(43)
Christian doctrine attempts to give shape to the Christian
life by laying the foundations for the generation and subsequent
interpretation of Christian experience.(44)
The language of Christian theology functions under
constraints similar to those affecting poetry: it is obliged to
express in words things which by their very nature defy reduction
to these words; nevertheless, there is a fundamental resonance
between words and experience.(45)
Cognitive theories of doctrine recognize that words are on
the borderlands of experience, intimating and signposting the
reality which they cannot capture. To apply pejorative epithets
such as `intellectualist' or `literalist' to the cognitive-
propositionalist approach to doctrine is to fail to appreciate
the power of words to evoke experience, to point beyond
themselves to something inexpressible, to an experience which
their author wishes to share with his or her readers. It is
also, of course, to fail to do justice to the many levels at
which cognitive or propositional statements operate.(46)
Theological statements simply do not operate at the same
level as mathematical equations. The charge of `literalism' is
vulnerable to the extent that it risks overlooking the richness
of non-literal language, such as metaphor, as a means of
articulation, and the importance of analogy or models
as a heuristic stimulus to theological reflection. It is simply
a theological truism that no human language can be applied to God
univocally; indeed, it is from the recognition, rather than the
denial, of this point that cognitive approaches to doctrine
begin.(47)
The cognitive dimension of Christian doctrine is the
framework upon which Christian experience is supported, the
channel through which it is conveyed. It is a skeleton which
gives strength and shape to the flesh of experience.(48)
To caricature Christian doctrine, then, as mere word-play or
as an attempt to reduce the mystery of God to propositions is to
fail to appreciate the manner in which words serve us. In order
for my experience to be expressed, communicated to or aroused in
another, it demands statements in cognitive forms. That these
cognitive forms fail to capture such an experience in its
totality is self-evident, and hardly a matter for rhetorical
exaggeration: it is one of the inevitable consequences of living
in history and being obliged to communicate in historical forms.
Schleiermacher recognized that doctrine expressed an experience
constituted by the language of the Christian community, thus
pointing to the delicate interplay of cognitive and experiential
elements in doctrinal formulations.(49)
In regard to doctrine, we have the following: 1. Doctrines
are perceptions, not total descriptions, which point toward God.
2. Doctrines only represent, in and of themselves they are not
literal. 3. They interpret Christian experience, provide a
foundation. 4. Doctrines "describe" something that
cannot be reduced to words. Hence doctrine is like poetry. Its
congruence with experience is one of "resonance." 5.
Doctrine points to the inexpressible. 6. Doctrine is
metaphorical, provides analogies, or metaphors for theological
reflection. 7. Doctrine is a skeleton, framework, or channel
for Christian experience. 8. Doctrine does not reduce the
mystery of God to propositions. As in Schleiermacher, doctrines
express an experience.
At this point, McGrath has essentially adopted the liberal
understanding of doctrine in that doctrine expresses the
experience of a God who is beyond language. As such, doctrines
about God are not really theological statements that directly
express truth. At the same time, McGrath intimates that doctrine
has certain second order functions. They provide a foundation
for subsequent experience, their use of metaphors and analogies
are a heuristic stimulus for theological reflection, and they are
a skeleton for the flesh and blood of Christian experience.
Let me return to my essay on Barth's understanding of
Anselm. link According to Barth,
the theologian begins with Scripture, seeking the intelligibility
of Scripture as received in faith. In that sense, the theologian
begins with the first order statements of Scripture but continues
with efforts to seek Scripture's underlying intelligibility.
When that intelligibility is received, it is given in statements,
propositions, doctrinal phrases that illumine Scripture. But the
receiving of doctrine, the illumination of the intelligibility of
Scripture, is also an act of God. It is a Word from God. It is
God speaking. When Anselm received the Name, "that which
nothing greater can be conceived," he recognized it as a
revelation. This revelation does not have the same status as the
biblical revelation. Scripture is prior, the fundamental
authority. Theology is derivative, beholden to Scripture. Even
so, Anselm believed that God took form as a Latin phrase spoken
to his understanding. This phrase was God the Word in Latin form
and Anselm could understand it. He reflected upon it, using the
categories of thought that one applies to objects, propositions,
to things that make sense. He could do this because the
revelation was propositional even as it pointed to the
transcendent God who dwells in light unapproachable.
The preceding is what Barth found in Anselm, and that is how
he overcame Kant. Prior to Anselm, Barth had accepted Kant's
belief that God could not be understood by the categories of the
understanding. After Anselm, and only after Anselm, was Barth
able to overcome Schleiermacher and write his Church
Dogmatics.
McGrath has not, and he cannot, respond to Lindbeck because
he hasn't really come to terms with Kant, with the core of
liberal theology, nor with a sound understanding of Chalcedon.
In light of his purpose in this text, he has not demonstrated the
"internal contradictions and vulnerabilities" of
liberalism and postliberalism, nor has he made plain the
"coherence of evangelicalism by bringing out the inner
consistency of the evangelical approach."
McGrath on Scripture
Consider the following, taken from opening sections on the
uniqueness of Christ and the authority of Scripture.
For Christians, Jesus is the embodiment and self-revelation of
God. At the heart of the Christian faith stands a living person,
not a book.(50)
Despite its high view of Scripture, evangelicalism has resisted
the temptation to identify the text of Scripture with revelation.
Scripture is regarded as a channel through which God's self-
revelation in Jesus Christ is encountered. Although it is a
bearer of that self-revelation in Christ, it is not to be
identified directly with that self-revelation. Scripture is not
Jesus Christ. Yet as Kuyper so aptly put it, we cannot encounter
Christ in any form other than that which we find in Scripture. .
. . There is a strongly Trinitarian dimension to the evangelical
understanding of revelation, which is particularly evident in its
affirmation of the distinctive role of the Holy Spirit.(51)
For evangelicals, there is something real which lies beyond the
text of Scripture, which is nonetheless rendered and mediated by
that text--that is, the Christian experience of being redeemed in
Christ. The emphasis on intratextuality tends to obscure the
fact that the person of Jesus Christ stands at the centre of the
Christian faith--and did so before the texts of the New Testament
were written down.(52)
Without a sound understanding of God's speech, Word, or act,
thought usually oscillates between two poles. On the one hand,
there are those who believe that Scripture is the literal Word of
God. They hold that its phrases, words, and deeds give the very
thoughts and deeds of God so that by reading them one immediately
knows God. This is fundamentalism as well as the Princeton
School. McGrath rejects this approach. The other alternative is
to believe that God is transcendent in such a way that God cannot
be identified with the biblical text but is something beyond it.
This is the position that McGrath accepts. That is why he will
say that "Scripture is not Jesus Christ," that
Scripture is a "channel" that biblical tests cannot be
"identified directly" with revelation, and that
redemption in Christ is "something real which lies beyond
the text of Scripture, which is nonetheless rendered and mediated
by that text," and that the "person of Jesus Christ
existed before the texts of the New Testament were written
down," as if the texts were quite different from the person.
In critical respects, when it comes to Scripture, McGrath is a
liberal.
This is not the place to enter into a lengthy description of
how Scripture was formed and why it is God's Word written. I am
doing that elsewhere. link What
can be said here, however, is that God the Word became incarnate
in Jesus Christ so that the words and deeds of Jesus Christ were
the words and deeds of God. Further, from a biblical point of
view, the words and deeds of a person, when narrated or written
down by others, are the original person in another form. For
example, Paul didn't just preach about Christ, he preached
Christ. His apostolic gospel was Jesus Christ in preached
form. Similarly when the biblical witness concerning Jesus
Christ was written down, it was and is Christ the
Word in written form. From that perspective, the Bible as a
whole is not simply about God the Word, it is God the Word
in written form. In the Anglican ordination service, ordinands
"do solemnly declare that I do believe the Holy Scriptures
of the Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God." They
do not say that the Scriptures are a "channel", or that
they "mediate" the Word of God. Similarly, in regard
to the bread and wine of communion, Jesus did not say, "this
is a channel of my body," or "this cannot be identified
with my body," or "this mediates my body," but
"this is my body."
In regard to incarnation, it is appropriate to say that a
finite reality is God because God the Word became
incarnate, and by the communicatio idiomatum, that finite
reality--Christ's body, his blood, his words, and his deeds--
are God. link When
these words and deeds are set forth in writing as Scripture, or
as bread and wine in communion, they are Jesus Christ in another
form. Therefore, Scripture is not a channel, nor is it true that
"Scripture is not Jesus Christ," nor must we say that
we cannot "identify the text of Scripture with
revelation," or that the text "mediates" the
Redeemer. Scripture is Jesus Christ, the Word of God
written, and the Word of God is God, so that Scripture is
God in written form. The words of Scripture are God's
Word/words. If this be not true, we do not have God in
Scripture. Only under the power of the Spirit does this become
apparent.
This can be said in another way. Word and Sacrament belong
to the second article of the Creed, not to the third. They are
the Incarnation in another form, in the form of writing and bread
and wine. God is there as real presence, as specific words, as
bread, as wine. Hearing the written Word and receiving the
Sacrament belong to the third article of the Creed, to the work
of the Holy Spirit. Even in Jesus' day, there were those who did
not hear his words as the Word of God. They are those who
blasphemed against the Holy Spirit. But their failure to hear
the Incarnate Word did not mean that God the Word was not
incarnate in Jesus Christ. God was and is Jesus Christ, and
Jesus Christ is Word and Sacrament in written and material form.
The position advocated here differs from fundamentalism in
several ways. I do not believe that the biblical witness to
Christ is exactly what one would find if one followed Jesus with
a video camera. This is due to the fact that decisive knowledge
of Jesus Christ was only available after the resurrection and
Pentecost. Only then was it possible to place Jesus' words and
deeds in their proper context as a saving act of God. As a
result, the apostles, led by the Spirit, preserved, summarized,
and amplified Jesus' words and deeds in order to bring out their
saving significance. That apostolic witness is the center of
Scripture. Further, the biblical witness sets forth the whole of
Jesus' ministry, and the whole cannot be rendered by simply
repeating a few of the original pieces. Secondly, the words and
deeds of Jesus, and the biblical witness as well, point beyond
themselves to God in his transcendent nature. As a result, the
biblical language is both literal and symbolic. Thirdly, simply
having the biblical words does not guarantee that one has God.
One must be obedient to the work of the Spirit which makes the
biblical words subjectively real as God's speech. I have
discussed these matters elsewhere.(53)
In the end, it is not exactly clear what theology lies
behind McGrath understanding of Jesus Christ in relation to
Scripture. I do get the sense, however, that two realities stand
at the forefront of his thought. These are the "living
person" of Jesus Christ as something other than the words of
Scripture, together with the evangelical recognition that
Scripture presents itself as the particular and concrete word of
God. I do not think he has theologically coordinated these two
perspectives. He doesn't make sense of his claims that Scripture
is the "word of God," that both "revelation and
doctrine have cognitive or informational aspects," that
Christ is "rendered" and "mediated," that
"Scripture is not Jesus Christ," and that Scripture is
not to be "directly identified" with revelation.
Consider the following statement.
Negatively, some evangelicals have argued that all critics are
influenced by their own cultural, philosophical, and theological
presuppositions, and that much of the criticism that has seemed
to undermine the authority of Scripture has reflected a deep-
rooted prejudice against the miraculous, which rests upon
rationalist rather than Christian presuppositions. Even scholars
whose work has been on other ways especially illuminating have
sometimes found it hard to come to terms with biblical miracles
and prophecy. Evangelicals rightly reject criticism based on
such prejudice as, in the first place un-Christian, and in the
second as based upon a flawed methodology, in which a secular
worldview is imposed upon the biblical material.(54)
Apparently, evangelicals believe in the biblical miracles.
But that raises an important question: What is the significance
of the biblical miracles? Before Hume, Kant, and the
Enlightenment, the claim was made that miracles validated the
truth of revelation. That is still true, but more needs to be
said. The Word became flesh to redeem the whole person including
the flesh. For this reason, the gospels devote as much space to
Jesus' healings and exorcisms as it does to his teaching and
preaching. In fact, the two are intimately related, the one
validating the other. If evangelicals believe in the biblical
miracles, they then need to do what the New Testament so clearly
claims that disciples of the risen Lord Jesus did: preach, teach,
heal, cast out demons, and more. A theologian that takes
Scripture seriously will be involved in these things, and speak
for a church that does these things. But McGrath does not make
these clear and obvious claims. Here is his description of
Christ's present work.
[Evangelicalism proclaims] An emphasis upon conversion or a `new
birth' as a life-changing religious experience.(55)
Christian theology cannot remain faithful to its subject matter
if it regards itself as purely propositional or cognitive in
nature. The Christ encounter with God is transformative. As
Calvin pointed out, to know God is to be changed by God; true
knowledge of God leads to worship, as the believer is caught up
in a transforming and renewing encounter with the living
God.(56)
A theology which touches the mind, leaving the heart unaffected,
is no true Christian theology--a point stressed by both Luther
and Calvin.(57)
The gospel is thus experienced as something liberating, something
which transforms our situation, something which is relevant to
us.(58)
Through faith, the believer is caught up in a new outlook on
life, a new structure of existence, embodied paradigmatically in
Jesus Christ,--and both in their proclamation and person,
believers reveal this story of Jesus Christ.(59)
Scripture, we have seen, possesses a strongly objective
dimension, in that it tells us about the way things are; it also
possesses a subjective component, through which it offers to
transform our inner lives--an offer which, in the evangelical
experience, is more than justified, and leads to an emphasis upon
evangelism as the means by which others might share in the same
`transforming friendship' (James Houston).(60)
We need to purge rationalism from within evangelicalism. And
that means recovering the relational, emotional, and imaginative
aspects of biblical spirituality, which the Enlightenment
declared to be improper. As Martin Luther constantly insisted,
Christianity is concerned with totus homo, the `entire
human person', and not just the human mind.()
... evangelism is about the proclamation of an objective truth
with the expectation that this will give rise to a subjective
response--that is to say, a response which involves the heart,
mind and total being of those who hear it. The Enlightenment
notions of `truth' and `knowledge', as critics such as
Kierkegaard pointed out with such vigour, fail to engage with
human nature in all its fullness, and focus instead on a purely
cerebral `faith', devoid of emotion and transformation.(62)
As a result of the foregoing, evangelicals believe that the
gospel affects the heart, the emotions, the entire self, the
inner life, relationships, and the imagination. It entails a
transformation, a new structure of existence, a transforming
friendship. The general impression is that the message of the
gospel is more existential than incarnate. In fact, these
phrases have a rather spectral quality in comparison to the
biblical revelation. According to Scripture, Jesus not only
preached and taught (something Evangelicals do), but he also fed
the five thousand, cast out demons, healed the blind, the sick,
and the lame, confronted the Pharisees, and much, much more. I
haven't seen many evangelicals doing these things. Jesus does
them, and an obedient church will do them in his name. I have
included examples on this website, link but you will not find them in
McGrath. There is a reason for this. In the opening pages of
this text he states,
Evangelicalism has long since got past the stage where it needs
to feel defensive about anything, and is perfectly capable of
mounting a sustained bid both for a justified presence within the
academic community, and for intellectual respectability as a
serious option of thinking people in today's world.(63)
I do not believe, and I have fourteen years of graduate
study as background, that it is possible to maintain one's
academic respectability and affirm the biblical words and deeds
of Jesus Christ as living options today. link It just won't happen. Or
conversely, if one achieves academic respectability, it is only
possible because one has failed to practice the biblical acts of
the Lord Jesus, to associate with those who do, and to make this
a constitutive aspect of one's theological enterprise. There are
doubtless exceptions to these generalizations, but not many.
At one point in his treatment of Scripture McGrath observes
that "recent scholarship has decisively undermined the New
Testament basis of this trend toward detaching Christian faith
from the historical Jesus."(64) Oddly enough, in a text
heavily laced with footnotes, this statement has no footnote by
which to corroborate this claim. The Christian faith cannot be
detached from the historical Jesus because the risen Lord Jesus
does today what Scripture proclaims he did then. McGrath needs
to make that claim, and he needs to be blunt about it. The New
Testament is very clear: the disciples just didn't preach and
teach as do evangelicals, they also healed, cast out demons, had
visions, spoke in tongues, and associated with the ignorant, the
socially despised, and those who were not intellectually
respectable. There are sectors of the church who do this,
Pentecostals among others, and a vast literature on this subject.
None of this appears in McGrath. Should he speak of these
things? Does he have the right to leave out major portions of
the New Testament revelation? If he does, is he really letting
God be God? Here is McGrath.
Evangelicalism is determined to `let God be God', and to receive,
honour and conceive him as he chooses to be known, rather than as
we would have him be. At its heart, evangelicalism represents a
relentless and serious attempt to bring all our conceptions of
God and ourselves to criticism in the light of how and what God
wishes to be known.(65)
A Theological Possibility
Finally, I would like to offer a theological possibility,
one that would appear to be congruent with the theological
perspective implicit in McGrath's A Passion for Truth. It
is a slightly modified version of the operant theology of the
Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church in the United States.
link
Suppose revelation is composed of two factors, Word and
Spirit. This is orthodoxy, God is revealed by Word and Spirit.
Suppose further that the human nature of Jesus Christ was
"particular, truthful, cognitive, and historical,"
while the divine nature, the Word that became incarnate in
Christ, was a mystical, sublime reality beyond finite
comprehension. In other words, follow Kant. Suppose also that
God the Spirit is miraculous and that Scripture is the final and
definitive authority for Christian faith. What consequences
would follow from these theological assumptions?
If the foregoing be true, God the Spirit would miraculously
break in upon human knowing to reveal the mystical Word through
the concrete particulars of the biblical revelation to Jesus
Christ. Since the Word is mystical, it would have certain
ineffable characteristics as revealed by the Spirit. For
example, to quote McGrath, the words of revelation would be
concrete and particular, but they would refer or point to
something "lying beyond the horizons of our
comprehension," reflecting the "sheer elusiveness of
human experience." This something could not be
"imprisoned within a verbal matrix," or
"identified directly" with revelation. It would
require "poetry" and "symbolism,"
sophisticated linguistic forms that hint of something "which
we tantalizingly cannot enter." Since Christ would be
mystical and Scripture particular and concrete, "Scripture
would not be Jesus Christ," nor would the "living
person" of Christ be "a book." As a result, the
words of Scripture would not literally refer to the divine Word.
They would be "signposts" which would "point
towards" the elusive and mystical Word. As we read
Scripture, we would "resonate" to this Word, but never
grasp it conceptually.
This understanding of God would be Trinitarian and
Christological. The Father would send the mystical Word while
the Spirit would make the Word real to human knowing. The
pinnacle of this divine revelation would be Jesus Christ as known
in Scripture. In his particular, historical human nature, his
divine nature would be active, healing, teaching, and revealing
the glory of God in ways that ultimately defy understanding in
spite of their tantalizing yet profound effects. The
incomprehensible would begin with his virgin birth and reach its
highest expression in his cross and resurrection. In the cross
and resurrection believers would recognize that from
"henceforth know we no man after the flesh: yea, though we
have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him
no more." (2 Cor. 5:16) In other words, the cross would
mean the end of ordinary human knowing, knowing God as we do
other objects. A new form of knowing would emerge, given in the
resurrection where the ineffable and consuming nature of God
would be revealed through the glorified body of the Lord. Given
the ecstatic nature of this experience, the disciples could only
express it in the broken yet ecstatic speech of the New Testament
resurrection narratives.
This Trinitarian and Christological picture of God is
consistent with the understanding of God found throughout
McGrath's book. The human nature of Jesus Christ, as well as the
language of Scripture, would be affirmed as "particular,
truthful, cognitive, and historical." The divine nature of
Jesus Christ would be seen as "something ultimately lying
beyond the horizons of our comprehension." This vision is
heretical for it fails to affirm that the divine and human
natures of Jesus Christ come together to form one person. By
virtue of that personal union, it is appropriate, even necessary,
to attribute human properties to the divine nature and divine
properties to the human nature. This is the communicatio
idiomatum. It implies that the divine nature must have the
properties of the human. This is only true of Incarnation, and
not of other created realities. link As a result, the divine Word
must be "particular, truthful, cognitive, and
historical." It cannot be mystical and ineffable, although
the Word points to the mystery of God's transcendence. This is
what McGrath does not fully grasp, and for that reason, his
underlying theology is seriously flawed.
In conclusion, it must be said that McGrath has presented
elements of an orthodox understanding of God, but failed to
coherently organize those elements into doctrinal formulations
that place them upon a firm theological foundation. As a result,
at critical junctures, he has adopted the liberal perspective he
professes to refute.
Endnotes
1. McGrath, Alister. A Passion for Truth. Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996.
2. McGrath, pp. 23-4.
3. McGrath, p. 25.
4. McGrath, p. 27.
5. McGrath, p. 40.
6. McGrath, p. 63.
7. McGrath, p. 71.
8. McGrath, p. 49.
9. McGrath, p. 135.
10. McGrath, p. 79.
11. McGrath, p. 137.
12. McGrath, p. 107.
13. McGrath, p. 99.
14. McGrath, pp. 47-8.
15. McGrath, p. 122.
16. McGrath, p. 73.
17. McGrath, pp. 80-1.
18. McGrath, pp. 222.
19. McGrath, pp. 222.
20. McGrath, pp. 76.
21. McGrath, p. 77.
22. McGrath., pp. 78.
23. McGrath, p. 72.
24. McGrath, pp. 78-9.
25. McGrath, p. 79.
26. McGrath, p. 79.
27. McGrath, p. 80.
28. McGrath, p. 86-7.
29. George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984, pp. 16f.
30. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 20-1.
31. McGrath, p. 137.
32. McGrath, p. 169.
33. McGrath, p. 139.
34. McGrath, p. 141.
35. McGrath, p. 142.
36. McGrath, p. 142.
37. McGrath, p. 142-3.
38. McGrath, p. 143.
39. McGrath, p. 107.
40. McGrath, p. 102.
41. The term "proposition" has connotations of
logical or
mathematical truth, and Scripture is not of that form. But God
does use language that one can understand when he speaks.
42. McGrath, pp. 138-9.
43. McGrath, p. 139.
44. McGrath, p. 142.
45. McGrath, p. 144.
46. McGrath, p. 140.
47. McGrath, p. 140.
48. McGrath, p. 145.
49. McGrath, pp. 144-5.
50. McGrath, p. 37.
51. McGrath, p. 54.
52. McGrath, p. 156.
53. See the section entitled "Johnston's Jesus"
in link, as well as link.
54. McGrath, pp. 99-100.
55. McGrath, p. 22.
56. McGrath, p. 79.
57. McGrath, p. 79.
58. McGrath, p. 80.
59. McGrath, p. 44.
60. McGrath, p. 102.
61. McGrath, p. 175.
62. McGrath, p. 178.
63. McGrath, p. 9.
64. McGrath, p. 48.
65. McGrath, pp. 37-8.
The Rev. Robert J. Sanders, Ph.D.
robertsanders@iglide.net
Copyright, June, 2002
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